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To what extent should banks, insurance companies and employers be allowed to use 
personal information about the people whom they lend to, insure or employ in setting 
the terms of the contract? Even when different treatment is motivated by profit not 
prejudice, banning discrimination (when combined with mandatory protection against 
failure) may well be the best way of effecting redistribution of income. Unlike income 
taxation this policy achieves its goals without much adverse effect on incentives. 
Public provision of low-powered incentive contracts issued on generous terms is also 
a potent instrument of efficient redistribution. This is true even if the government 
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Justice is blind. Not so credit, insurance and labour markets. For example, 
women tend to have less costly motoring accidents than do men. Thanks 
to competition between insurance companies, this difference is reflected 
in premiums. Should such gender discrimination be legal? If so, does it 
follow that the disabled should pay higher premiums than the rest of the 
population? What if accident rates differ by race? There is evidence that a 
poor credit record is correlated with accident propensity. In the US 
missing a credit card payment puts up the cost of motoring insurance. 
Eight states are legislating to prevent this. Are they right to do so? Should 
insurance contracts be independent of all personal characteristics? This 
paper addresses such questions. 
 
Companies of all sorts are increasingly using sophisticated methods to 
predict how individuals will perform.
1 For example, banks use statistical 
analysis to distil an array of personal information it into a single “credit 
score”. This is used to determine whether to grant a loan, how large it 
should be and the interest rate to charge. Whether it is actually legal to 
collect and utilise information involving personal characteristics varies. 
In most jurisdictions motoring and life insurance premiums can differ 
with gender but not race, whereas employment and credit contracts can 
vary with neither.
2 The distinction may be related to whether market 
differentials are most plausibly motivated by profit or prejudice.
3 For 
example, under the British Disability Discrimination Act 1995, insurers 
are required to justify any different treatment on the basis of actuarial 
data, medical research information or medical reports about an individual. 
                                                 
1 Chiappori and Salanie (2000) argue that in motoring insurance there is no evidence of asymmetric 
information. 
2 Montana is the only US state to have passed legislation to prohibit gender-based classification in all 
personal insurance policies (auto, health, disability, annuities and life). 
3 The distinction is related to the “taste for discrimination” model of Becker (1957) and the “statistical 
discrimination” approach of Arrow (1972) and Phelps (1972). In the former, if race or gender is a 
significant explanation of the terms of trade (after controlling for human capital and other observable 
economic variables) it is attributed to some parties disliking to interact with the disadvantaged group. 
In the latter the interpretation is that the characteristic is correlated with economic performance. For 
example, if in a loan market blacks are charged higher interest rates (as found by Blanchflower, Levine 
and Zimmerman (1998) the implication of Becker’s approach is that in equilibrium blacks are less 
likely to default than whites whereas in Arrow and Phelps the opposite would be true. There is some 
evidence that blacks are more likely to default (Berkovec et al, (1998)) though under ECOA this would 
not be a defence. In standard models neither kind of discrimination leads to Pareto inefficiency though 
the taste for discrimination seems more troubling. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) provide a persuasive 
account of how group identity can lead to self-fulfilling expectations of discrimination implying 
welfare losses.   3
Nevertheless, legislation often goes beyond requiring that differentials are 
evidence based. The US Equal Credit Opportunities Act is explicit; it 
allows the use of 
 
“…..any empirically derived credit system which considers age if such 
system is demonstrably and statistically sound in accordance with 
regulations of the Board, except that in the operation of such system the 
age of an elderly applicant may not be assigned a negative factor or 
value.” 
 
There is a tendency that differentials, even if performance based, are 
disallowed if they appear to harm disadvantaged groups. This paper 
argues that there is merit in such policies. In essence, prohibiting 
contractual terms from depending on individuals’ innate characteristics 
redistributes income towards the less able whilst preserving financial 
incentives to perform well. Progressive income taxation is not so efficient 
in helping the disadvantaged because it decreases the return to effort. 
 
Consider insurance contracts. To keep premiums low, contracts generally 
do not offer complete coverage. Deductibles give buyers of insurance an 
incentive to take care to avoid losses. They also discourage small claims 
for which the administrative cost is a high proportion of the loss. 
 
The role of the premium is different. It is payable whether or not a loss 
occurs, so it has little effect on the incentive to take precautions. The 
premium is there to raise the revenue to pay the claims. In a way it is like 
a tax. The question is how should the tax burden be distributed? 
Remember, this is a tax with the distinctive property that it has negligible 
disincentive effect. It can therefore be set to equalise consumption with 
no negative effects. So, for example, if diabetic motorists are higher-risk 
than non-diabetics, there is no good reason for reducing their 
consumption by charging them the higher premium occurring in an 
unregulated market.
4  In fact, high-risk types should pay lower premiums. 
Since they are more likely to suffer a loss and have low income, a 
premium cut is more likely to be really useful for the high-risk types.  
 
What though of diabetics becoming motorists because of the cross-
subsidy? Surely they must be imposing costs on other motorists through 
higher premiums, so it would be better were they not to become 
                                                 
4 There is limited evidence on whether diabetics are worse motoring risks. Following the DDA act of 
1995 British insurers to stopped charging higher premiums, but this may be because it is cheaper to 
avoid litigation even though diabetics are higher risk drivers. The British Government does not allow 
type 1 diabetics to drive heavy goods vehicles.   4
motorists. Not necessarily. Think about a diabetic just willing to pay the 
market premium: the net social benefit from their decision to become a 
motorist is then zero. But as we have noted, there is an overall social gain 
if the premium burden is distributed more equally. Since there is a social 
gain if the diabetic’s policy is ‘subsidised’ by non-diabetics, it becomes 
strictly socially desirable for the diabetic to be a motorist. 
 
This is not to deny that an equal treatment policy may go too far. Those 
with very low driving ability obviously should not be motorists. A cut-off 
is appropriate, with all those above paying the same premium, but the 
threshold should be below the market level. Even without such a limit, 
the no discrimination solution may create more benefits than does the 
unregulated equilibrium. 
 
Notice that there is only a benefit from redistributing towards diabetics 
who choose to become motorists. For those who do not, there is no reason 
to think that their marginal utility of income is different to that of the rest 
of the population. Thus a transfer of income to diabetics irrespective of 
whether they are or will become a motorist (ability-based redistribution) 
is not especially beneficial. 
 
Subsidising diabetic insurance is probably feasible, but in other cases 
implementing subsidies is difficult. The subsidies should go to the less 
able but this may run into trouble. It may be impossible to claim a falsely 
high ability, but it is easy to under achieve. Think of performance in a 
vision test. Or ability may be observable but not verifiable. Firms may be 
able to recognise the good managers and compete for them with the offer 
of lavish stock options, yet it is not feasible for the government to specify 
verifiable criteria to determine transfers on the basis of intrinsic 
managerial ability. Equal opportunity legislation may then be a 
compromise. Consider a “least-favoured-person” law that mandates that 
offers should be made to all irrespective of disability, race or gender even 
when laissez-faire differentials are not the result of prejudice. Such equal 
opportunity legislation may make matters worse; principals may respond 
with contracts that induce costly self-selection. For example, insurance 
companies would then have incentives to find indirect ways to target low 
risks. They may respond with policies with very high deductibles that 
only appeal to good drivers who are unlikely to claim. Relative to 
allowing discrimination on the basis of observable indices of driving 
ability, the good drivers are worse-off because of the lower coverage, 
while the less able drivers still end up paying the same high premiums. 
This reaction could be avoided by a statutory minimum deductible. Then   5
insurance companies could not attempt to ‘cherry-pick’ the good risks by 
offering cheap low-coverage options. 
 
Designing and enforcing such regulations may be difficult though. An 
alternative is direct government provision of subsidised insurance. Loan 
contracts and employment contracts involving performance pay involve 
the same structure, so the arguments apply in these settings also. An 
unregulated market tends to offer the less able low payoffs for both 
success and failure. The government can uplift both payments but in 
preserving relatively low financial rewards for good performance it self-
selects those treated worst in the unregulated market without harming 
incentives. To implement this scheme, the government requires no direct 
knowledge of ability. Its aim is redistribution, but appropriate incentives 
to perform well are preserved. 
 
When insurance companies have some information as to a client’s type 
but the information is incomplete, there are further considerations. 
Competition sets a high premium for applicants in a group known to 
comprise a high proportion of accident-prone people. Even if you know 
yourself to be fairly safe, you may choose not to become a motorist 
because the insurance premium is so high. Were the same person a 
member of a group known to have below average risk they will secure a 
lower premium and so may choose to become a motorist. Thus, the 
marginal buyer in a high-risk category is likely to be safer than the 
marginal buyer in a group known to be safe on average. 
 
Now imagine that discrimination is banned, so the premium settles 
somewhere between the levels previously charged to the two groups. 
Then, there would be a tendency for the worst drivers in the good group 
to drop out to be replaced by better drivers from the high-risk group. This 
enhances efficiency and helps keep the premium low. 
 
Three literatures are related to the analysis here. It has long been argued 
that information concerning an individual's type can make everyone 
worse off ex ante by eliminating opportunities to trade risk. This line of 
argument can be seen in Dreze (1960), Hirshliefer (1971) Marshall 
(1974), Arrow (1978) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982). So, for example, 
the public availability of genetic information hampers the provision of 
medical insurance and in the extreme, if outcomes are fully predictable, it 
may cause it to vanish. If people buy insurance in the absence of genetic 
information, revealing it makes them worse off in expected terms. This is 
a case where equal treatment of unequals is justified. By adding moral 
hazard, this paper shows that the best solution may not be equal treatment   6
but to offer better terms to the least able. How to implement this outcome 
is not self-evident. Whether or not moral hazard is present, prohibiting 
insurers from using information that is available to clients may be counter 
productive since it creates adverse selection, as Doherty and Thistle 
(1996) and Hoy and Polborn (2000) demonstrate. The answer is to 
constrain allowable contracts or to have recourse to public provision. 
 
Akerlof’s (1978) study of the economics of tagging also bears on the 
analysis. The setting is the classic utilitarian dilemma, as formalised by 
Mirrlees (1971). The government cannot observe workers’ ability or 
effort but there are no information problems within the private sector 
(perhaps because everyone is self employed) so no need for incentive 
contracts. Diminishing marginal utility of income makes it desirable to 
take from the rich and give to the poor, yet doing so weakens the 
incentive to earn. Consider the relative merits of two instruments of 
redistribution. A negative income tax provides a subsidy to all of those on 
low incomes irrespective of the group to which they belong whereas 
tagging selects a “needy” segment of the population to receive an extra 
transfer. Per dollar of tax revenue spent, tagging concentrates the benefits 
on the poor for whom the marginal utility of income is high. Due to the 
efficiency cost of raising tax revenue, the selective scheme may be 
preferable. Given that the aim is to redistribute income it seems odd that 
the magnitude of the transfer received by a poor person depends on 
personal characteristics that appear irrelevant for welfare. The resolution 
of the puzzle is that without this feature redistribution schemes involve 
too much of a scattergun approach to benefits. So rather than institute 
negative income taxes, it may be efficient for tax allowances to vary with 
disability, region, gender or race or to subsidise inferior goods. 
 
The set up of this paper differs from the usual optimum tax framework in 
that in the base case ability is observable (though it may not be verifiable) 
whereas even within the private sector, effort is not. Making contracts 
depend inversely on ability is of course a form of ability taxation. When 
ability is observable by the private sector, two cases are straightforward. 
If output is observable and deterministic, everyone receives the same 
piecework contract. The private sector has no need to observe ability and, 
as everyone receives the same contract, requiring equality of treatment is 
inconsequential. The government would wish to levy an ability tax, but 
would have to estimate ability itself with no market benchmark. This is 
almost certainly not feasible. All that is left is income taxation, with the 
usual equity/efficiency trade off. 
   7
When output is not observable performance pay is ruled out, but suppose 
that inputs as well as ability can be contracted on. More able types (their 
input generates higher output) would then have superior contracts in 
market equilibrium. Assuming, as here, that the utility function is 
additively separable, a utilitarian would equalise incomes and the more 
able be required to supply more effort (e.g. Salanie (1997 p. 44).  
The reversal of market outcomes resembles that in the base case here but 
is for the plausible case of noncontractible inputs. Indeed it is common to 
observe market equilibria in which contracts varying across individuals 
but some form of performance pay is involved so the assumptions studied 
here cover an important class of cases. One implication of the analysis of 
this paper is that whether or not individuals are in receipt of incentive 
contracts, when income is stochastic but abilities differ it is optimal to 
present individuals with a menu of income tax rates from which they 
must choose prior to the realisation of uncertainty. 
  
Most directly linked to this paper is Whinston (1983) which applies a 
Mirrlees approach to the design of a socially optimal disability insurance 
scheme. Individuals differ in their ex ante probabilities of being able to 
work and there is ex post moral hazard as the able can choose to declare 
themselves unfit and claim the disability pay. The main findings are that 
if disability probabilities are public information those at greatest risk 
should pay the lowest premiums and receive the highest disability 
compensation. When disability probabilities are private information, 
everyone should receive the same payment. The first of these features 
also emerges here. One added ingredient of the present analysis is that 
there is an ex ante choice of activity. At first sight this creates the 
potential for efficiency loss through misallocation between activities, 
especially when type is private information. Too many bad drivers will be 
on the road. In fact with pooling it is advantageous that more drivers are 
on the road in a pooling equilibrium. A further difference is the treatment 
of moral hazard. Here it is of the ex ante variety. This is not of much 
significance in itself. What matters more is that in Whinston only one of 
the two ex post groups is subject to moral hazard (the disabled cannot 
work). This feature is responsible for the optimality of pooling under 
adverse selection. In the main set up here, all agents are subject to 
“smooth” ex ante moral hazard. Even when type is hidden, pooling is no 
longer optimal. The analysis here does not assume hidden types but that a 
scheme that rewards lower ability is often not incentive compatible. 
Firms know ability but the less able are treated worse and cannot 
misrepresent higher ability. The government may want to reverse the 
situation but cannot as the able can feign incompetence. Because of moral 
hazard considerations this does not mean everyone should be treated   8
alike. It does though provide the basis a good case for allowing equal 
access to policies. Doing so forces companies to offer alternatives that 
efficiently redistribute to the less able. Thus the focus here is on 
regulation; whether prohibiting the use of personal information in a 
market system is beneficial, rather than the design of an optimal state 
scheme when private insurance is for some reason precluded. Although a 
first step is to look at a first-best scheme, this is only a starting point in 
appraising the regulatory reform.  
 
The Whinston model is developed by Anderberg and Anderrson (2000). 
In their model all individuals have the same intrinsic accident 
probabilities but there is a verifiable choice between two occupations that 
differ in risk. The cost of entering the safer activity varies across the 
population and is private information. The question is how the insurance 
contract should differ between occupations. The desirability of offering 
better terms to those in the risky sector is offset to the extent there is 
mobility between sectors.
5 In this paper the issue is the extent to which 
policies should vary according to personal characteristics rather than how 
policies should vary with the type of car or job. The Anderberg and 
Anderrson analysis, which assumes that accident probabilities are the 
same for all, is not therefore applicable. 
 
Vercammen (2002) is also related to this paper. A credit market is studied 
in which a fixed number of risk-neutral entrepreneurs are able to increase 
the probability of project success by applying unverifiable effort. Finance 
is through a debt contract. Given risk neutrality, incentives are maximised 
by minimising the advance. The borrower’s return in the fail state is then 
zero. A higher interest rate lowers effort, and deadweight cost as a ratio 
of revenue raised is increasing in the interest rate. When type is hidden, a 
pooling interest rate emerges and aggregate welfare tends to rise relative 
to the outcome when type is visible. In this setting the non-negativity 
constraint on fail-state payoff binds, so all that varies across types is the 
reward for success. To cover the lender’s costs, the less able are therefore 
under-incentivised relative to the more able. If type were hidden the 
overall distribution of incentives is improved and welfare may be higher 
than if type is hidden. Risk neutrality is important here. With risk 
aversion maximum self-finance does not arise under full information and 
to compensate for the disincentive effect of higher interest rates, the less 
able will have smaller advances. So pooling has no particular incentive 
                                                 
5 Black and de Meza (1999) also provide a case for subsidising risky occupations even when private 
insurance is possible.   9
benefit. Moreover, hiding type leads to separation not pooling and this is 
welfare reducing. Though suggestive, even ignoring entry issues, the 
model is an incomplete foundation for equal opportunity legislation. The 
story of this paper is that equal treatment yields distributional gains 
without entailing efficiency costs rather than it serves to enhance overall 
incentives. 
 
The next Section of the paper provides an analytical introduction to some 
of the issues emphasising the beneficial effects of cross-subsidy induced 
entry. Section 3 develops the main analysis by putting moral hazard into 
the model along with verifiable types. Section 4 considers partially 
hidden and unverifiable types, then Section 5 looks at the merits of equal 
opportunity legislation and public provision as methods of moving 
towards a full optimum. Section 6 introduces noisy signals and shows that 
the case for equal treatment is strengthened. The same is true when it is 
costly to acquire information, as in Section 7. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn. 
 
2. A First Look 
To introduce some of the issues, consider a simple case with neither 
moral hazard nor adverse selection. Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and 
Abbring Chiappori, Heckman, and Pinquet (2002) suggest these 
assumptions hold empirically for the insurance market for young French 
motorists. This is a world where people are unresponsive to incentives so 
distributional considerations govern policy. This is true even when the 
number of motorists depends on the cost of insurance.  
a) Assumptions A1 
 
•  The economy comprises a collection of risk-averse individuals 
with identical utility of income function but differ in their accident 
probabilities. 
  
•  An individual’s accident probability is public information.  
 
•  No moral hazard 
 
•  Accidents involve both a financial and non-pecuniary cost (but 
liability law internalises externalities). 
 
•  Not being a motorist is safe and yields the same utility for all.  
 
b) Market equlilibrium   10
 
If individual i  becomes a motorist their expected utility is 
] ) ( )[ 1 ( ) ( L C B U p G U p E i i i i i − + Π − − + Π − =  
where  ) 1 ( i p −  is the accident probability,  B G >  is gross income in the 
two states,  i Π  the insurance premium, C is the contracted compensation 
in the event of loss and L  is the direct utility cost of an accident. Under 
these assumptions it is trivial that the market equilibrium involves full 
insurance on actuarially fair terms. Expected utility on becoming a 
motorist is 
L p B p G p U E i i i i ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( ( − − − + =  
It is worth becoming a motorist if  Z Ei > , the utility of a non motorist. So 
there is some threshold value of  p  above which it is worth becoming 
a motorist. 
 
c) Socially-optimal contracts 
 
Consider first the trivial problem of contract design when the number of 
motorists is fixed at n but cross-subsidies are allowed. Full coverage 
clearly remains optimal so the utilitarian’s planning problem is to 
maximise 
 
() () 0 ] ) ))( ( 1 [( . . ] ) ( 1 ( ) ( [
0 0 = Π − − − − − Π − = ∫ ∫
n n
dn n B G n p t s dn L n p n G U W  
 
where the  th n'  best driver has accident probability  ( ) n p − 1  and their 
premium is chosen as  () n Π . For simplicity n is treated as continuous. 
 
The F.O.Cs require 
 
() λ = Π − ) ( ' n G U  
 
So the premium should be independent of accident probability. 
 
Turn now to the choice of n given a population of  N potential motorists. 
Letting  ) (n Π  be the breakeven (pooling) premium when the best n drivers 
become motorists. For simplicity n will now be treated as a continuous 
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Write the breakeven (market) premium as  ) (n Π . If n is the laissez faire 
number of motorists 
 








with the signing following from concavity of the utility function. 
 
Unregulated entry on pooling terms is though excessive. The marginal 
entrant is no worse off if refused insurance, but all the intra marginal 




The implications of the foregoing results are immediate. 
 
Policy Summary A statutory requirement that all motorists are fully 
insured on terms that are independent of their personal characteristics 
(except that applicants below a competence threshold strictly less than 
the free market level may be refused insurance) raises a utilitarian 
social welfare function.  
 
In the case of a uniform distribution of probabilities with support [0,1], 
5 . 0 , 0 , 2 . 1 , 26 Y U Z L G = = = =  the market solution has 88% of the 
population as drivers. Equal opportunity with no entry restriction results 




Notice that the formulation here assumes that transfers between the 
motoring sector and other goods are not possible. In fact, other things 
equal, motorists will spend less on other goods so have higher marginal 
utility of income. This implies that there will be aggregate gains from   12
subsidising motoring insurance, raising the revenue through taxes on 
other goods. 
 
The model is structured so that pooling attracts some new drivers but no 
one ceases to participate. Although it is plausible that this tendency 
prevails there may of course be some safe types with low benefits from 
driving. Pooling will cause them to exit and this is a welfare loss. In 
principle pooling could now generate a loss. Suppose there are two types 
of potential driver. Some are risky but attach a high value to driving 
whilst the rest are perfectly safe so under laissez faire are in no need of 
insurance. Under full pooling the premium is too high to justify the safe 
types becoming motorists. So the effect of the regulation is to lower the 
welfare of the safe drivers without benefiting the rest. This is clearly an 
extreme case. It seems implausible that pooling would drive many good 
risks out. There may be some groups that have low claim propensity and 
low benefits; perhaps low mileage drivers. The problem of inefficient exit 
under equal opportunities only arises if these types are identifiable. In that 
case the characteristic can be excluded from the equal treatment 
requirement. 
 
The formulation here assumes that equal opportunity legislation has no 
effect on the alternative activity. This is natural for a number of settings 
(such as motoring) but not for all. Suppose for example that there are two 
occupations each with the same gross monetary return for success. An 
individual has two characteristics, their probability of success in 
occupation A and in B. There is a (possibly small) non-pecuniary benefit 
associated with success, the same in both jobs. Under full information 
workers select the job in which his or her probability of success is the 
highest and receives a fixed wage equal to their expected gross revenue. 
Now suppose that equal opportunity legislation is applied along with a 
minimum wage. If prior to this policy the average success probability 
were equal in the two jobs then the legislation would have no effect on 
the allocation of workers. Both occupations would offer the same pay and 
so individual choice still be decided by success probability, consistently 
with unchanged composition. Equal opportunities then have the 
distributional benefits just analysed. The situation is different if prior to 
legislation the average success probability in one job, say A, was higher 
than in the other. Perhaps the generally competent people tend to have a 
comparative advantage in A. Equal opportunity legislation will now draw 
people into A. This is a mixed blessing. Those in B who move tend to be 
low earners in both occupations so the effect is redistributative. On the 
other hand not everyone is working in the job in which their probability 
of success is highest, which is plainly inefficient. The best policy here is   13
obvious; there should be pooling not only between people in the same 
occupation but across occupations. Everyone should be paid the same 
irrespective of where they work and their own productivity. This could be 
achieved by an income tax/subsidy scheme that takes 100% of income in 
excess of the average level and fully subsidises anything below. This 
seems far too extreme to be sensible, but what is missing from the model? 
First, there may be non-pecuniary aspects of jobs that differ between 
people. Now progressive income tax comes at an efficiency cost. Second, 
some jobs may require prior investment in human capital but there is no 
incentive to undertake this if jobs pay the same ex post. Finally, when 
performance depends on unverifiable effort, it is efficient for firms to 
create incentives by establishing performance pay. Income taxes interfere 
with these incentives. The main theme of this paper, explored more 
thoroughly in the next two sections, is that equal opportunity legislation 
avoids the last of these problems. To the extent that investment in human 
capital is observable the first problem does not apply since people making 
different investments do not have to be treated equally. As for the second 
issue, as we have noted, reallocation between activities could be an 
advantage or a disadvantage. Effects are though unlike income taxes. In 
the basic model of this section equal opportunity legislation drew less 
able types into the risky sector. A progressive income tax would 
discourage entry. 
 
3 Verifiable Types, Hidden Action 
 
In this section the model is modified to incorporate moral hazard. The 
chosen setting is once again insurance, but this is analytically identical to 
other incentive contracts, such as loan contracts or performance pay. 
 
Assumptions A2 
•  The economy comprises a large number, n, of risk-averse 
accident-prone individuals. An accident causes an individual’s 
income to fall from S to F and involves a direct utility cost of L. 
Whether an accident occurs is verifiable. 
•  The accident probability is (1-p) and can be diminished by exerting 
precautionary effort with utility cost  ) , ( i a p C , where  i a is an 
observable and verifiable “ability” parameter and 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 < < > > pa a pp p C C C C . The choice of  p is not verifiable. 
•  Clients are risk averse with utility function U(y)-C(p)-x where x=L 
if an accident occurs and x=0 otherwise. 
•  Accidents are independently distributed so the Law of Large 




First consider the market equilibrium with competitive insurance 
companies. Let a company commit to a contract that results in individual 
i obtaining net income  i W if there is an accident and  i B  when there is no 
accident. So  ) ( i B S −  is the insurance premium and  ) ( i W F − −  the net of 
premium payout in the event of loss. The client maximises 
  ) , ( ) ) ( )( 1 ( ) ( i i i i a p C L W U p B pU E − − − + =         (1) 
so the choice of success probability satisfies 

































dp           (3) 
In competitive equilibrium, i B  and  i W  are chosen to maximise expected 
utility subject to the incentive constraint (2) and to the insurance 
company breaking even, which requires 
0 ) )( 1 ( ) ( = + − − + − ≡ i i i i s W F p B S p R                                 (4) 
where  i s  is a subsidy for issuing a contract to individual i. The required 
conditions for an interior solution follow from the Lagrangian 
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where  ) , ( / ) , ( i p i pp a p C p a p C = η  is the elasticity of marginal precautionary 
cost. 










Following a similar procedure for variations in  i W , it follows from the 
Lagrangian that an interior solution satisfies (4) and   15
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At an optimum, the extra utility per dollar of foregone revenue to the 
insurance company should be the same whether it is  i W  or  i B  that is 
increased. Of course the revenue effects of the two variations are not 
symmetric. A decrease in the premium holding constant net payout in the 
event of loss is partly offset by a decrease in the probability of loss 
whereas greater coverage raises the probability of loss.
6 
 
One property of the market solution is of relevance for subsequent 
analysis. If  0 > i i ds dλ  the incentive scheme just analysed is not optimal. 
Such increasing marginal utility of transfers implies that the insurance 
company can then increase the attractiveness of its offer by contracting 
with the client that two policies will be prepared, one that is optimal for 
* s si =  and the other for  * s si − = . The client chooses between two 
unmarked envelopes each containing one of these policies. Such 
randomisation schemes are not observed so it will be assumed that the 
conditions for  0 > i i ds dλ  do not hold.
7 To see what is required to exclude 
randomisation, it is convenient to define 
0
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where  0 > H  is the bordered Hessian signed from the second order 
conditions and  B W W B W U B U φ θ λ λφ λθ
2 )) ( ))( ( ( − ′ ′ − ′ ′ − ≡ ∆ . 
                                                 
6 In an interior solution the revenue effects of reducing the premium can never be fully offset, as 
inspection of (5) and (6) reveal. 
7 The same result can be achieved if the client takes a fair gamble prior to buying insurance. This 
makes it seem that the client is a risk lover but this is not really so. There is diminishing marginal 
utility of consumption but not necessarily of income. The reason for the latter is that when income is 
high their may be more self insurance so avoiding the deadweight cost of moral hazard. The celebrated 
Friedman and Savage (1948) reconciliation of simultaneous purchase of insurance and lottery tickets is 
a different story; here the potential implication is sequential purchase.   16
 
Remark The optimal incentive scheme is non random iff  0 < ∆  
 















In contrast to the market solution, the social planner can cross subsidise 
within the insurance sector. The implication is that (5) and (6) must hold 
for λ common to all n clients. Along with the overall breakeven 
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Suppose that the cost function is  ) )( (
γ β α p a f C i + =  with 0 ) ( < ′ a f  so 
1 − =γ η  and is independent of ability. It then follows that in the social 
solution  i W  is higher for the less able and so is i B .  
 
Proposition 1 If random incentives are not optimal and  ) )( (
γ β α p a f C i + = , 
then it is socially optimal that both  i B  and  i W  are decreasing in ability. 
 
Proof 
To find how incentives should vary with ability the procedure is to 
perform comparative statics on (5) and (6) for a given i holding λfixed. 
This is eased by the fact that with η constant the FOC w.r.t. to  i B  is 




















dB λφ λθ φ θ λ .  
 
The signings follow since it is readily checked that 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 > = < > a a W B φ θ φ θ  (the latter two terms are signed as η is 
independent of a but from (2),  ) , , ( a W B p i i  rises in a whilst  0 > ∆  follows 
from the non-randomness of incentives. 
 
To illustrate Proposition 1, suppose  a p C 3 /
3 =  so  2 = η ,  0 , 10 = = F S  and 
the utility function is CARA with risk aversion parameter  5 . 0 = r . 
Calculation reveals that λis decreasing in the relevant range. Allowing   17
for endogenous  p, the market equilibrium for  1 = a is plotted in Figure 1 










The optimal payments for  1 = a  and for the higher ability level  2 . 1 = a are 
shown below. 
  1 = a   2 . 1 = a  
Competitive W  2.9  3.2 
Optimal W  3.5  2.7 
Competitive B 6.1  6.5 
Optimal B 6.5  6.1 
 
In this case the socially-optimal solution raises the return of the lower-
ability individual so much that, despite their lower success probability, 
they are better off than the more able. 
 
Of course Proposition 1 reports sufficient but not necessary conditions for 
the more able to receive strictly worse terms. Making the necessary and 
sufficient terms easily interpretable has proved elusive. One further result 
is that if  ) ( i a p C C − = then  η ) 1 ( p p −  is certainly increasing in ability and 
applying the same methodology as above, it is socially optimal thatB 
falls with ability. 
 
A possible objection to Proposition 1 is the assumption that the whole 
population is engages in some activity, say driving, giving rise to the   18
same income contingencies. A relevant alternative for the less able is not 
to drive at all. Then the social planner must decide how many drivers 
there should be. To model this, becoming a motorist is represented as a 
discrete choice creating utility M  but at some monetary cost and 




Rejecting the activity which gives rise to income risk yields utility 
M Y U w − = ) ( . 
 
There is now the issue of how many policies to sell. In particular, should 
more policies should be issued than under laissez faire. Suppose that n 
policies are sold, with the rest of the population,  n N − , choosing the safe 
activity and enjoying utility w. Given that w is independent of type, it is 
of course best that it is the most able types that engage in the risky 
activity. The planning problem is now to select  i B , i W  and n to  
) ( ) ( ) ( 0 . . ) ( ) ( ) ( max
1 1










First, n should certainly not be smaller than under competition. Everyone 
choosing the risky activity (rather than taking the w option) in a free 
market does so on terms that enable the insurance company to breakeven. 
So there can be no social loss in the social planner insuring them on 
breakeven terms rather than excluding them. Yet it has been 
demonstrated that with the same set of clients as under competition, it is 
best to offer terms that differ from the competitive equilibrium. Consider 
the most able individual rejecting the risky option in the competitive 
equilibrium. Were this individual offered insurance on terms making 
motoring at least as attractive as the w option but as close to breakeven as 
possible, the expected financial loss to the company would be negligible. 
Offered instead the distinctly more attractive contract that is one of the set 
that maximises aggregate welfare, the previously marginal buyer will 
certainly accept it and by definition, overall benefits are greater. With 
such contracts it must therefore be strictly advantageous for social 
welfare for this client to participate and the same must apply to potential 
clients of slightly lower ability. Consider though whether it would be 
worth selling to every applicant who applies on the terms that are socially 
optimal were they to accept. Then the marginal buyer obtains zero 
                                                 
8 This formulation supposes that cross subsidies are between those engaging in the risky activity. 
Allowing transfers between activities yields similar results and if, as is possible, the marginal utility of 
income is the same in the two activities there will be no transfers between them.   19
expected surplus, but being the highest risk of all and given overall 
breakeven, this client must involve an expected financial loss.
9 Hence, 
surplus would be greater were this individual not offered insurance. 
 
Proposition 2 To maximise welfare under A2 and A3, more policies 
should be sold than under laissez faire. Policies should though be rationed 
in that there is a cut off ability level below which policies are not 
available even though these clients are willing to accept finitely worse 
contracts than offered to those only infinitesimally more able. 
 
A natural extension is to suppose that M  varies across individuals and is 
private information. A general treatment is messy, but for illustrative 
purposes suppose that M  is either zero or high. The individuals with 
0 = M  never become motorists and Propositions 1 and 2 apply to those 
with the positive M . The economic point of these remarks is to further 
illustrate the difference between ability based redistribution and 
regulation of contracts. The strategy developed here involves 
redistribution to low-ability motorists. Subsidising low ability non-
motorists at the expense of the high ability lowers aggregate utility. So 




4 Unverifiable Types, Hidden Action 
 
Although ability has been assumed to be observable by the competitive 
firms it may not be verifiable, in which case it is not a feasible tax base. 
This is especially true if, as seems likely, it is easy to feign incompetence. 
Consider vision. If, as in the competitive equilibrium, those able to score 
above a threshold qualify for better insurance terms this is 
implementable, but a scheme rewarding those doing badly in the test is 
useless. 
 
In addition to taking this hidden-types constraint into account, the issue of 
implementation in a competitive insurance market is addressed. 
Competition is specified in standard game theoretic fashion; two or more 
firms make simultaneous offers of contracts then clients choose the one 
they prefer. 
 
                                                 
9 There may be no marginal buyer for the whole population may wish to purchase when offered the 
socially optimal terms given that they are buyers. A version of the argument above implies that it may 
be better if not everyone buys. An extra high risk buyer does impose externalities on existing clients.   20
The analysis requires identification of how the slope of indifference 










Given the incentive contract,  p increases in ability and so therefore does 
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Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, this slope increases in ability by 
less than does the indifference curve. In Figure 2 the convex functions are 
indifference curves, the concave are iso-revenue curves (not necessarily 
breakeven level) and the bold curves are for higher ability types. The 
slope properties noted above imply that at a tangency between iso 
revenue curve and indifference curve for a high-ability type the 
indifference curve of a low ability type is steeper and tangency with its 
own iso revenue curve lies at a higher W . From now, for simplicity, only 

















                                        







So far it has been assumed that type is observable, but whether or not this 
is the case, if firms are not allowed to contract on their information, the 
setting is equivalent to hidden types. With sufficient risk aversion a 
separating equilibrium emerges. Firms offer a menu of contracts that 
results inducing the high-ability types take on just enough risk to dissuade 
those of low-ability following suit. The lowest ability types are no better 
off than in the absence of equal opportunity legislation and the rest are 
worse off.
 10 Think of a requirement that annuities must be available on 
terms independently of gender. As women live longer on average, 
pooling terms would be unattractive to men. Women will buy annuities 
and men purchase shorter duration financial instruments. This is no gain. 
 
Consider first public provision by a government unable to observe 
abilities. Relative to the full-information market equilibrium, 
redistribution with no efficiency cost is now possible.  
 
Proposition 3  Under the assumptions of Proposition 1 aggregate welfare 
is increased from the full-information market level by appropriate 
government provision of contracts even if type is not observable to the 
government. Much redistribution can be achieved at no efficiency cost. 
This solution can be decentralised by a scheme which taxes low 
premiums and subsidises high premiums.  
 
Proof. Suppose that contracts A and L are offered. High-ability types 
select contract A on a revenue function delivering positive expected 
income whilst the low-ability opt for contract L on a loss-making offer 
curve. These two contracts are breakeven overall. The allocation is Pareto 
efficient (as a result of the tangency properties). Contract L is the best 
that can be offered which preserves Pareto efficient separation and leads 
to overall breakeven. By Proposition 1, to maximise social welfare the 
low-ability type should have higher state-contingent payments than the 
more able. As the configuration in the diagram involves a subsidy to the 
less able, but stops short of the optimal redistribution it must represent a 
welfare improvement relative to the market outcome. 
 
Finally note that premium is payable irrespective of the state so 
subsidising the high premium and taxing the low is efficient 
redistribution.  
 
Note that the solution in Proposition 3 involves the maximum 
redistribution consistent with Pareto efficiency. Further redistribution can 
                                                 
10 This is shown explicitly in Doherty and Thistle (1996) and Hoy and Polborn (2000).   22
be accomplished by widening the gap between B and W for the two 
contracts. As the efficiency cost of doing this is initially vanishingly 
small but the distributive gains finite, some Pareto inefficiency should 
certainly be introduced. The way this is best done is by ensuring that the 
more able type gets an efficient contract (tangent between indifference 
curve and iso-revenue frontier) but giving the less able a contract with an 
inefficiently high ratio of W to B. The reason for this is to achieve 
incentive compatibility at higher levels of redistribution. To prevent the 
more able type taking the contract intended for the less able the revenue 
raised from the more able should be extracted at minimum utility cost and 
then the contract for the less able made just as unattractive as required. 
Having the least rather than most able type with the distorted contract is 
of course the opposite configuration from that arising in a separating 
market equilibrium when type is private information. 
 
Two reinterpretations of Proposition 2 are of practical relevance; 
 
a)  The analysis can be applied to the design of socially optimal 
business loans. The only change is that the contract must yield 
positive revenue to cover the cost of the capital. Relative to the 
market equilibrium, it is socially optimal to subsidise high interest 
rate advances and tax those made at low interest rates. Note that 
these interventions involve transfers that are independent of 
outcomes. An income tax/subsidy raising the same revenue as the 
interest rate scheme would cause the banks to modify their contract 
so as to lower good state payment and raise bad state income, 
thereby sacrificing social efficiency.  
 
b)  Consider a Mirrlees (1971) style optimal income tax problem. 
Ability is private information as is effort. Unlike the Mirrlees 
formulation, productivity conditional on effort is stochastic but the 
distribution for the more able first-order dominates that for the less 
able and, given ability, the distribution of outcomes for greater 
effort dominates that for the less. No private insurance is available 
for life chances. Proposition 3 now implies that workers should be 
offered a choice of income tax schedules. The able types will select 
the rate that taxes high incomes at a lower rate than is selected by 
the less able.   
 
Tax/subsidy schemes have their problems. They may be bureaucratically 
costly. High premiums or interest rates should be subsidised when they 
are the result of low ability but not as a result of occupational choice or 
high risk activities. This may not be easy to implement. Moreover, paying   23
a subsidy when the gross premium is high is an invitation to corruption. 
An alternative is public provision. This too may have hidden costs. To 
keep competition alive there is a case for partial government provision. 
The objective is to attract the less able, offering lower-powered incentives 
but on terms that the private sector could never match financed through 
taxes on private contracts. In principle, this would replicate the full 
scheme, but ossification may still creep in.  
 
Potentially attractive since direct intervention is avoided is regulation that 
prohibits discrimination according to observable characteristics and 
requires a minimum of protection against failure (a maximum deductible 
in the insurance case, exempting some of bankrupt debtors’ assets in the 
credit context, or setting a minimum basic wage in the case of an 
employment contract) If there are good properties in principle, the need 
for government bureaucracy is reduced and controlling for different 
activities and occupations is eliminated.  
 
To see the mechanics, in Figure 2, let W  be the minimum allowable 
payment in the fail state. Change the parameters so that when both types 
take the contract at L there is overall breakeven. There will now be a 
pooling solution at this payment. The able type now taking a Pareto 
inefficient contract but the benefits of redistribution may be sufficient that 
there is an overall gain relative to the market solution.
11 
 
Consider again the case of  a p C 3 /
3 =  so  2 = η ,  0 , 10 = = F S  and the utility 
function is CARA with risk aversion parameter  5 . 0 = r . There are two 
types. In the market solution for a =1.2 the payments are B=6.3, W=3.1 
with the endogenous success probability 0.45. For a =0.6 the payments 
are B=5.5, W=2.5 with the endogenous success probability 0.36. The 
agents are very incompletely insured under these contracts so moral 
hazard is very significant. With pooling at a minimum W involving an 
efficient contract for the a=0.6 type, the incentive payments are 
intermediate at B=5.8, W=2.8. The financial loss on the contract bought 
by the low ability type is 0.487 . There is inefficiency in that were the 
a=1.2 to face a lump-sum tax of 0.5 their welfare would be the same as in 
the equal opportunities solution. The deadweight cost of effecting the 
transfer by equal opportunity is thus some 2.6% of the transfer. 
Nevertheless there is a gain. The equal opportunity policy creates 
                                                 
11 Setting the minimum W lower at the efficient level for the able types may allow for a separating 
equilibrium in which the lowest ability types are peeled off so replicating the tax/subsidy solution. This 
equilibrium does not generalise to the case of many types though so here we look at the pooling case 
which is anyway nearly as good in welfare terms.    24
aggregate welfare equivalent to giving the less able types a lump-sum 
subsidy of 0.14 in the market equilibrium.  
 
The equal opportunity solution is very close to what is achieved by a 
government able to set optimal cross subsidies subject to type being 
hidden. This solution has B=6.019, W=2.79, for the able and B=5.7, 
W=2.86 with the financial transfer 0.5. Relative to the equal opportunity 
solution the low ability type is slightly worse off and the high ability 
better off but the difference is negligible. Optimal fiscal redistribution 
slightly distorts the contract received by the less able types and equal 
opportunity policy the contracts received by the able but in both cases the 
able are just as well off if they take the deal offered to the less able. The 
fiscal redistribution ends up only slightly superior.  
 
An alternative fiscal approach is to tax the high realization (in the case of 
the loan interpretation this would be an income tax) returning the revenue 
as a an equal lump-sum to everyone in the population or as a subsidy to 
the low realization. This is redistributory since the more able have a 
greater chance of obtaining the high realization, but the power is low 
since it is the difference in success probabilities that determines the extent 
of redistribution. Moreover, every contract is now distorted away from 
the optimal incentive mix. In our example the optimal policy of this sort 
is hardly better than lasissez faire and certainly much worse than interest 
or premium cross subsidies or equal opportunity policy. 
 
To summarise the policy implications; 
 
   25
Proposition 4 Whether or not type is hidden, under the other assumptions 
of Proposition 1, aggregate welfare may be increased from the market 
level by a statutory minimum W  and a requirement that all contracts must 
be available irrespective of ability. Examples show the welfare achieved 




5. Noisy Signals  
 
Principals typically do not have precise information concerning an 
individual’s economic attributes. Rather, noisy but informative signals are 
observed. To be specific, suppose that there are two observable, disjoint 
groups of agents with the distribution of abilities in one group differs 
from that in the other.  
 
The first issue is that in standard signalling models, group membership 
does not influence offers. Either a separating equilibrium exists within 
each group (so group membership is uninformative) or else no pure-
strategy equilibrium exists.
13 In this world there is no point in screening 
(whether in credit or any other kind of market). For group membership to 
influence the terms of trade, pooling equilibria must exist but these are 
notoriously difficult to generate. One possibility is to invoke a Wilson 
(1977) “anticipatory” equilibrium. An alternative is to retain the 
Rothschild and Stiglitz structure but allow preferences to depend on a 
variety of characteristics (not just ability) as developed in de Meza 
(2002).  
 
Easier is to let cost be independent of ability and the state contingent 
gross payoffs be  ) ( ), ( i i a z F a z S − − ) with  0 ) ( ' ), ( < i i a z a z . It is immediate 
that (5) and (6) still apply and so therefore does Proposition 1. Now the 
                                                 
12 It seems appropriate to compare this policy with the rather different conclusions of de Meza and 
Webb (1987). There the economy comprises a collection of risk-neutral agents differing in ability 
though effort is not a choice variable. Under hidden types there is a pooling equilibrium in which the 
implication is that the information-impacted sector expands relative to the full-information level. As 
there is universal risk neutrality, a utilitarian would not care about distribution. Consequently, if types 
were initially observable, imposing equal opportunity legislation would certainly lower welfare. As 
Proposition 4 is for Assumptions A1 there is no alternative activity, the possibility of misallocation is 
closed off. Now the asymmetric-information solution (augmented by a prohibition on contractual form) 
is fully efficient and better on distributional grounds than the full-information solution. With an 
alternative safe activity introduced (Assumption A2), extending equal opportunity policy to all ability 
levels could lead even a utilitarian to prefer the laissez-faire solution. Along the lines of Proposition 2, 
there will though be an ability level such that if equal opportunity policy only applies to those above 
this threshold the solution improves on laissez faire. Moreover, this threshold involves more agents in 
the risky sector than in the free-market solution. 
13 This is the famous Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) result.   26
slope of indifference curves is independent of ability so only pooling 




•  m members of a collection of risk-averse motorists have costlessly 
observable characteristic M whilst the remaining w individuals 
have characteristic W.  
 
•  Everyone has the same utility of income function but an 
individual’s accident probability is private information with the 
distribution in group M differing from that in group W 
 
•  No moral hazard 
 
•  Compulsory third-party coverage due to “shallow pockets”, 
enforceability issues or to preclude inefficient separation. This 
requirement gives rise to a pooling equilibrium with self-damage 
uninsured (a given risk class can only be attracted with offers that 
also appeal to all worse risks).  
 
•  Competitive insurance providers with no administrative costs (the 
equilibrium involves statistical discrimination) 
 




The expected utility of individual i belonging to group  j is 
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i p −  is the accident probability, 
j Π  the insurance premium and 
B G−  is self damage. The utilitarian’s social problem is to maximise 
 









where L is third-party damage. 
 
The F.O.Cs require   27
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where 
j p  is group js’ is the average safety rate for group j. 
 
The result with fixed composition is by now familiar. To maximise 
aggregate welfare the group with the highest accident rate should have 
the lowest premium Prohibiting unprejudiced discrimination raises 
welfare relative to laissez faire 
 




•  Everyone has the option of not driving in which case their utility is 
independent of their p 
 















p F  
 
Under laissez faire suppose the pooling premiums are 
W M Π > Π  so for the 
marginal drivers 
W M p p ~ ~ < .Under laissez faire some non-drivers have lower 
ps than some drivers. Banning discrimination ensures only the safest 
drivers are on the road. 
 
Proposition 5  Under A4 and A5 a sufficient condition for banning 
unprejudiced discrimination to raise social welfare is that the number of 
those insured does not rise. 
 
Proof   
 
When the number of buyers in each group is held fixed, welfare rises 
when discrimination is banned.  
 
Keeping the premium at the pooling level were their no change in 
composition, the decisions to change status directly add to welfare. 
 
Moreover, the pooling premium may fall. Those with lower accident 
probabilities replace those with higher. Thus if the number of buyers 
falls, the average accident rate falls and so the competitive premium 
declines. 
   28
Numbers do decline if, for example, above some accident threshold the 
groups are identical but below it one group has more representatives than 
the other.  
 
6. Costly Information Acquisition 
 
Given that information on type is free, it has been demonstrated that 
aggregate utility is higher if its use is prohibited. There is a further reason 
for disallowing discrimination. When information on types is expensive 
firms will still acquire it but the resources expended are ultimately at the 
expense of the agents. This conclusion is not dependent on the agents 
having private information as to their ability, as will now be 
demonstrated. 
 
Consider a labour market in which two risk-neutral firms are engaged in 
an English auction for a manager of unknown quality. Moral hazard is not 
an issue. The manager is either worth H or L with expected value M. At 
the outset workers do not know their type but each firm can find out the 
manager’s type at cost I. There is then a mixed strategy equilibrium in 
which firms randomise over whether to evaluate. First consider the 
equilibrium bidding strategy; 
 
An informed firm drops out at the worker’s true value 
An uninformed firm drops out at M
14.  
 
The strategy of the informed firm is obvious. As for the uninformed firm, 
if the bidding reaches M the uninformed firm knows its rival is either 
informed and has discovered the manager is worth H or else the rival is 
uninformed. In the former case the uninformed firm knows that to win the 
wage must rise to H and there will be no profit, and in the second case 
expected profit is negative if the worker is hired for more than M.  
 
Given the optimal bidding strategy an informed employer earns H-M 
when facing an uninformed bidder and zero otherwise. So if each firm is 
informed with probability π  and the prior probability the manager is of 
high ability is Π, then in a mixed-strategy equilibrium  








− = π  
                                                 
14 There are also asymmetric equilibria in which one of the uninformed bidders drops out below M. The 
dissipation of resources is then all the greater.    29
As the expected profit of the firms is zero, the expected wage of the 













I if evaluation is banned.  
 
Proposition 6 When there is symmetric imperfect information but firms 
can become informed at a cost, prohibiting them from doing so raises the 




This paper has shown that the market distribution of incentives is not 
generally welfare maximising. Competition rewards the more able with 
superior contracts, but social efficiency often requires the opposite. 
Granted that moral hazard leads to agents being incompletely insured, 
were everyone to have the same incentive contract the expected marginal 
utility of increasing income in all states is greater for the less able since 
they are more likely to have the low income associated with the fail state. 
This is the underlying reason the less able should have better contracts, so 
much so as sometimes to have greater expected utility. Such positive 
discrimination is not feasible if it is possible to hide high ability, or if 
ability is observable but not verifiable. When better deals cannot directly 
be given to the less able any offered contract should be available 
irrespective of ability with regulation ensuring a minimum of protection 
in unfavourable states. So prohibiting “discrimination” on grounds of 
gender, race or disability may be efficient even if competitive market 
differentials are prejudice free. One implication is a case against allowing 
banks to adopt credit-scoring techniques. 
 
A further benefit of disallowing the use of informative but noisy signals is 
that, rather paradoxically, more accurate social selection then ensues. 
When everyone faces the same price it is the most able fraction of the 
population that opt for contracts but when price differs according to 
group membership type1 and type 2 errors occur. In addition there may 
be cost savings in information acquisition, a pure social gain. 
 
Preventing firms from offering terms that subvert the regulations will be 
difficult though. Then the analysis provides the basis of a case for state 
provision of insurance, loans and employment on terms that appeal to 
those the market treats worst. One feature of optimal public provision is 
that it should involve weaker performance incentives than offered by 
profit maximising firms. 
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An analytically trivial but practically important extension in the labour 
market case is if disability entails a direct cost on the employer, say in 
modifying machinery. Write this cost  0 ) ( ' ), ( < i i a z a z  (effects are identical 
if the state-contingent gross payoffs are reduced by disability 
to ) ( ), ( i i a z F a z S − − ). It is immediate that (5) and (6) still apply and so 
therefore does Proposition 1. Lower state-contingent productivity or the 
cost of catering to a disability does not upset the conclusion that the 
disabled should receive unambiguously superior contracts. Moreover, let 
the safe alternative to employment be unemployment. Proposition 2 then 
applies. The ability threshold below which agents are unemployed should 
be lower than the free market level even with a positive  z . Prohibiting 
employers from making offers on terms that depend on the level of 
disability and setting a minimum ability threshold above which offers 
must be made is welfare enhancing. 
 
The most compelling objection to policies that require employers to be 
blind to “ability” is that competence is often the result of prior investment 
rather than innate talent. If ability is endogenous there will be moral 
hazard effects if those not investing can still secure attractive terms, say 
in government employment. There are two responses to this. First, the 
moral hazard is inescapable but redistributing through constraining the 
form of incentive contracts is superior to the use of income taxes. Income 
taxes distort ex post incentives whereas equal opportunity policy preserve 
them. Second, it may sometimes be possible to draw a distinction 
between productivity effects that an individual can control and those that 
they cannot. Only the former involve moral hazard, so discrimination 
involving the latter can often be outlawed with no efficiency cost. Indeed, 
the analysis here suggests that positive discrimination may well be 
justified. For example, if race is correlated with barriers to human capital 
acquisition then positive discrimination on this characteristic is 
potentially beneficial. It is commonly held to be unjust to penalise people 
for what they cannot help. Such a view will frequently coincide with 
efficiency considerations. 
 
Economists’ instinctive advice that disadvantaged groups are best helped 
through income redistribution rather than by directly regulating 
contractual relationships is not generally valid. By such means 
redistribution can be accomplished without any inefficiency loss at all. In 
the standard optimum tax framework every dollar received by the poor 
lowers the income of the rich by more than a dollar. As Okun (1975) put 
it, redistribution can only be implemented by means of a leaky bucket. 
Equal opportunity policy is a watertight bucket. Prohibiting contracts   31
from utilising personal characteristics that would further disadvantage a 
disadvantaged group is a potentially efficient strategy. 
 
Of course public policy in these areas is ultimately fuelled by factors 
beyond those dreamt of in utilitarian philosophy, most notably by 
conceptions of procedural justice. Even so, it is worth knowing that there 
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